tv Hudson Institute Discussion on Nuclear Arms Control Part 1 CSPAN June 7, 2019 7:17pm-8:03pm EDT
the 2019 congressional directory is a handy spiral- bound guide. order your copy online store for $18.95. >> is the director of the defense intelligence agency talking about russia and tiny weapons programs and the state of missile defense systems. from the hudson institute this is 45 minutes. good morning and welcome to
hudson institute. i'm a senior fellow specializing in missile-defense and clear deterrent and i have the privilege of hosting the director of the defense intelligence agency and directly following this portion of the event today there will be another panel of senior u.s. officials directly following that. please do stick around. we will take a 15 minute break in between the two so we can get some refreshments if you would like to do that and what i would like to do is introduce the director and turn it over to him to allow him to make some initial remarks and i will have a conversation based on his remarks and i will save room for questions from the audience. thinking about those and keep your question brief and we will try to get you as many as we can. lieutenant general ashley pete junior became the-on 3 october 2017.
formally served as the army deputy is chief of staff when he was a senior advisor army chief of staff all aspects of intelligence and security. a career army military intelligence officer and he has commanded of the company battalion quadrant. i could go on and on and he has a very illustrious career and i commend his bio to you and i want to get to the points of his remarks and that is we would like to have a conversation about the chinese and russian missile and nuclear program so, with that, i will turn it over to you.>> thank you. good morning, everybody.
good morning everybody. all right. make sure you are with me. let me think the hudson institute for cohosting this and the opportunity to speak with you today about the russian and chinese trend we are tracking. with return to our nuclear capabilities the forefront and for the defense intelligence agency in particular and the core mission is to understand foreign military capabilities and provide decision advantage. let me start with russia. after working together for decades to achieve real newk reductions russia is upgrading the capacity it is likely to get over the next decade.
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons including those employed by ships, air draft and ground forces. these warheads include tactical range systems that russia relies on to deter and defeat nato or china in a conflict. the stockpile of nuclear weapons already large and diverse is being modernized with an eye toward greater accuracy, longer-range and lower yield for the potential of the fighting role. we assess russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed or in development. they include, but are not limited to short and close range missiles ground watch cruise missiles including the nine m-72 nine missile which the
us government determined violates the intermediate range trees. as well as any ship or summary missiles, torpedoes as well as depth charges. for comparison united states currently has a single nonstrategic nuclear weapon system. we assess russia has 2006 nonstrategic nuclear warheads not covered by the treaty and because of the lack of russia transparency we have uncertainty in our understanding of the scope and disposition of the stock while. accurately accounting for these nonstrategic nuclear weapons is not only complicated by the lack of trench currency by the dual nature capability. these systems lack external distinguishing features that would allow the observer to differentiate between
conventional and nuclear variance. -such as with the inf treaty the initiative russia has not fulfilled them. by 2015 russia had completed that appears to be purposely designed to disguise the true nature of their activity as well as the true capacity of the missile. the compliance is ultimately determined by u.s. enter agency policy committee. want to be clear about the role
of the intelligence committee. the job down to analyze the activity that has implications for countries international obligations. they do not use the word compliant but rather characterizes actions inconsistent with the intent of such related. uses those assessments to help the interagency process. the united states has determined that russia actions have strained key pillars of arms architecture. chemical weapons, open skies, the vienna documents and the treaty on conventional armed forces in europe. in addition to the anticipating nonstrategic nuclear weapons russia claims to be developing new warhead designs for strategic systems such as a new high yield earth penetrating warhead to attack ardent military targets like the u.s.,
allied and chinese command and control. the development of these designs and overall stockpile management has been enhanced by the approach nuclear testing. the united states believes that russia is probably not adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium in a matter consistent with the standard. our understanding of development believes russia testing activities would help improve the nuclear weapon capability. the united states by contrast has to work on such benefits the ongoing buildup in the strategic and nonstrategic nuclear horses is made possible by sustained and prioritized investment with nuclear weapon and its infrastructure. by 2013 they had developed and
modernized dozens of experimental facilities and the budget has increased roughly 30% in real terms from 2010 to 2018 to support these and other operations. the contrast to the united states which has increased the production and has the capacity to process thousands of warheads annually. increase the overall stockpile is not the only source of concern spending -- extending from the program. within the confines of the new start treaty russia claims the overhaul of the strategic forces is roughly 70% complete. every leg of the triad is being modernized and russia is building new strategic systems including silo-based missiles a
submarine launched missile many of these new systems have greater warhead delivery capacity and the systems they are replacing, for example. the aging assess 25 road mobile icbm carries a single nuclear warhead while its replacement the 27 can carry multiple warheads-giving them the ability to upload more warheads through a strategic system. the aging heavy icbm carries up to 10 nuclear warheads while the russian president claims that the farm on the replacement carries more warheads and will also be capable of caring the hypersonic . we assess russia is hearing
to the new limits on deployed warheads this will give them the ability to increase the number of warheads in a time of crisis. they are also pursuing novel nuclear delivery systems that create a strategic challenge for the united states and which are difficult to manage under the current agreement. in march 2018 president putin unveiled these systems which includes air continental range, nuclear power, nuclear capable nuclear armed intercontinental cruise missile and russia will modernize automated nuclear command and control launch system the high profile announcement in march 2019 makes clear that russia will continue to prioritize in the
nuclear forces even at a time of budget constraints. the ultimate guarantee of the survival and perceives the slowest which it is used and directs the resources against the nuclear modernization. is quantitative and qualitative improvements to the nuclear arsenal has implications for the united states and our allies. the large and diverse stockpile facilitates a doctrine that envisions a course of nuclear weapons. russia assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or first years of nuclear weapons would serve to de-escalate a conflict on terms favorable to russia. the defense officials have
spoken publicly about de- escalating a conflict to limited nuclear years and it is a fact that the russian military has appeared plans and is well-trained to transition rapidly to nuclear use in order to compel and and a conventional conflict. their perception is that it could terminate a conflict on terms favorable to russia increases the prospect. let me turn to china as russia is not the only state that is a strategic competitor. over the next decade china will likely double the side of it nuclear stockpile and in the course of implementing it nuclear arsenal. launch more than the rest of the world combined which takes
that water summation to continue and the trajectory is consistent with what the president's vision this was laid out at the party and stated the military would be transformed into a first-tier by 2015. china has developed a new mobile had version of the icbm and new submarine launched ballistic missile. with the announcement of a new strategic bomber china soon will field it. demonstrating the commitment to expand the role of nuclear forces in beijing aspiration. like russia or china is working to fill those precision strike systems. the overall arsenal will be much smaller than russia and does not make this any less concerning.
based on the united states experience we understand the efforts required in rapid expansion of the nuclear weapon program and capabilities. the government information indicates that china is possibly preparing it year- round and development that speaks directly to china growing goals and nuclear force. further, they continues to use chambers at the test site and chinese leaders joined russia and watering down the language of the statement that would have affirmed the understanding of zero yield testing. combination of these facts and the transparency owned the activity and question as to whether china could achieve such progress without activities inconsistent with the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
it is important to note that in addition to modernizing china and russia are pursuing emerging technologies that have potential to revolutionize welfare and challenge superiority. is the annual threat assessment that this has all highlighted the resurgence of the power competition they have embraced the mindset that is getting the approach to nuclear modernization and investment. it will remain central- therefore a critical area of analysis and we were to provide our leadership. >> thank you very much for those remarks. the one thing that caught my ear there when you were talking
about testing, the russians have been conducting tests that are inconsistent with ctbt and zero yield. and you talk a little more about that and explain the implication of that and how that would benefit the program? >> i can't get into details of that. the protocol is that they are set up in such a way that they are able to operate beyond what would be necessary for a zero yield so the facility they are operating have that capacity to operate something other than zero yield. the concern is my closing statement with the sideline we are not willing to affirm that they are actually adhering to that which is how we have operated. >> and with china as well. >> and often times when we talk
publicly about russia, let's stick with russia, with their approach to the nuclear forces and this concept that they could escalate or de-escalate. we get pushback. there is no evidence of that and nothing in the official documentation. if you can talk about why your assessment is in fact-you said it is a fact that they are testing in this manner and that we are confident that this is their approach to why it is organizing their entire arsenal this way and that their strategy that they have lowered the threshold of when they might consider nuclear use really conventional conflict. >> part of their doctrine he goes back so there is not a no first use policy from russia and they see that as-you hear
that different ways. some escalate to de-escalate it has been written about in terms of escalation control where they think that using a low yield nontraditional nuclear weapon would bring other powers that would be involved to the table where they could control the escalation and talks would ensue from that so they see that as an opportunity to provide escalation control. i was looking at some testimony and one of the things he does is when you see something in the language to understand the nature whether it is russia or china and it is important to look at how that was stated and one of his comments when it was stated in russian it was escalate to win was the actual -they use that terminology. >> and sticking again with russia, you talk about how the
upload capability because a lot of times we think of arms control we think of current warheads and having transparency , but you really hit a couple times on upload capability. okay just so you understand if you go to the treaty there are limitations in place and russia in compliance and the limit for the number of warheads that are the is 1550 and there is a subset when you look at the triad subs and icbm and long- range aviation strategic bombers , at any one time you would not have more than 700 platform deployed and ended additional bush buffer that are not deployed and those are subject
to inspection and treaty. we talk about upload as you build additional capabilities and go through the modernization you have added capacity inside those delivery systems and additional capacity for warheads and you think you have extra space to bring more in a time of crisis and you could quickly move beyond that limit of 1550 and a time of crisis. last one on russia. i thought it was interesting that you talked about how the forces are designed to deter nato portraiture potentially defeats if it came to that and- in terms of the way they think about their nuclear force. to give us more information on that? how russia views china in this
contest?>> in terms of competition, all of the nations look at every other nation as a potential competitor and they capabilities you would say his alliance there and there is a relationship private it as more transactional than anything else. when russia or china or the u.s. get those capabilities they develop in such a way that they can use them irrespective of who the enemy may be. to bring that out of the context that that is a possibility as well. let's switch over to china and i will take your questions. you said that they have tested more missiles than the rest of the world i think in one year? i would have to look, but in recent time.
and my understanding is that has been their approach to the military trading strategy. can you talk a little bit about the missiles that the chinese have that have they been party to the treaty they would be in violation because they have inf 80 to 90% would be in violation of the treaty. >> and back to the commander-i have not gone out and made a 90% determination but i would imagine it is a significant part of the inventory which is the intermediate range ballistic missile excuse me the 26th or the 21 which is a medium-range missile all could
be used in that regional context and were they signatories of the inf type treaty. a large part of the inventory would be subject to a future version of some type of a tree and right now they are not signatories to anything other than the comprehensive test ban and i have to go back and check i don't know that they have ratified it. the russians ratified it in 2000. >> analysis would conclude that the chinese are modernizing their nuclear portions in a way that would be inconsistent with the desire to comply with standard that we would be comfortable with? >> that is our belief in terms of what we have seen. you have to look at where china was in the 70s. their first was developed in
the 70s. part of that rapid growth is because it did not exist in the capacity that russia or the united states has had. that has been a significant investment in testing out and of course the last 15 years. >> we have time for couple of questions. we will go here first and if you can see and organizations. >>-i heard you say i heard you say right now that the russians are set up at their test site in such a way that they could conduct experiments in excess
of yield and in your comments you imply that they probably already are doing this and not merely set up but they have been doing this for sometime, is that correct # >> we believe they have the capability. >> i believe they have the capability. >> my question is there are many types of activities that could exceed zero yield. some are very low and could be a few pounds less the type of things that yuko did during the eisenhower administration can you say a little more about the nature of these activities? are these activities that would be explosive of a few pounds or something more substantial?
>> i think from a strategic level it goes into the issue of adhering to the zero yield compliance. i think that is a strategic part of it. and you go through the process of upgrading were as you have, if you go beyond a zero yield and that gives you more of a sense that your designs are viable. >>-[ inaudible question ] i am
wondering whether you see a trend away from this classical chinese approach that only keeps nuclear weapons for short retaliation. is that no longer true? he separates and compartmentalizes unlike the russians, unlike maybe north korea. a little more context on what they have done so we estimate the number of warheads the chinese have is in the low couple hundreds. we anticipate over the course of the next decade that will double. they have a no first use policy . they have also stated they would not use weapons against a
non-nuke power and at the end of the day is something that comes in existential threat and difficult to say that that would not become something because they have specifically stated it. we often think of countries investing more heavily or moving in the direction of relying more in terms of the military strategy for the united states continues to try to move away and real world events continue to ensure that the united states maintains a deterrent and trend lines are not positive in terms of the chinese reliance on nuclear weapons in the military strategy. >> i would say the trendlines are increasing and is is not just with the new year. with what they have done in terms of the military across aviation had a big area not the subject of this topic is the space counterspace and how they
are approaching or fighting every domain and a specific investment. >> thank you very much for is welcome. i am the national security editor at the washington times newspaper and at the risk of asking too much of a policy western i wanted to go back to the future of the inf and i wonder, would you say based on your analysis of the russia chinese posture that there is a positive way forward with the pursuit of the treaty and includes both russia and china and the united states and possibly other parties and who might they be?>> the follow-up will get more in the policy side . what i do understand some of the comments made by the chinese is they are less likely to be
interested in a multilateral and how they see relationships with other nations is much more a bilateral basis. >> and to remind you we will after we wrap it up here stick around because we will have a great policy conversation to talk about some of these policy implications. stick around for that. >> i wanted to follow-up on his question about your statements about the compliance or noncompliance with the treaty. if you could clarify, are you saying that russia has violated the ctbt or has facilities that are capable of conducting experiments or tests that violate and were you saying
that russia has resisted or has not stated that it shares the definition of what it prohibits which is zero yield test beyond? >> my understanding is that they have not affirmed the language and not an agreement to what that means. >> are you aware in april 2017 that the deputy at a public said that the ctbt prohibits no matter what the yield? >> i have not read that. >> i can pointed out to you afterwards. >> it almost doesn't matter on that. is the agency has assessed they are acting in a way with the- year-old and i can deduce that they do not share the same understanding of the united states which zero means zero.
>> you talk about how russia and china are increasing weapon and modernizing. but i'm wondering, because the emergence of this power competition, i am wondering, to what extent they are reacting to the united states modernization. this is beginning with the development of the stocks style stewardship program. the billions that work poured into nuclear warheads and was going on right now. the massive u.s. modernization, nuclear monetization program. to what extent are they reacting? are they trying to catch up with the united states or is this the way they undertook
independently of where the united states has been going. >> the china and russians will see us as competitors. they can deter an allied tornado operation i think is a natural evolution that they have this capabilities. it is maritime, it is space- counterspace, i think that is another area that is rich for discussion. the developments we've seen in space- counterspace. it is a whole modernization. we have been involved in this and they have watched us. they have watched us in desert storm . they watch us in 2003 and they saw the capability of the u.s. military and they took great note in the lacking capability they had. >> if i might just director
comments in the initial remark, a lot of these modernization efforts that the chinese and russians are taking are happening now. even though the united states is a modern nation plan on program, we are not seeing the fruit from that for years. you mention the fact we have the b-61 gravity bomb compared to what the russians and chinese have. i hear that a lot that pushback that it is in response. but really in my view, as an analyst, we are the one sleeping at the switch, the sense of urgency we have to compete with what the russians are doing and this information about what the chinese are doing as well. >> we have time for a couple more. >> julian barnes, new york times. general, how much is the current russian doctrine in
your mind continuation of soviet doctrine, how much of it is an evolution to the modern time. and, i wonder if you talk about the hypersonic program and how that interacts with nuclear capability in what the implications for u.s. deterrence is? >> it is an evolution. it is informed by new technologies. he saw that in march 2018. they looked at additional capabilities they wanted to build such as this unmanned nuclear powered nuclear capable vehicle that would be launched from a submarine. it goes into hypersonic which creates a challenge. the new icbm under development that they will build in the next couple of years, they will look at hypersonic said as one of
the applications that use that. and then back to the space having counterspace. they're looking at the technology that is available and thinking how do they shore up their weaknesses and from other asymmetric standpoint because at a full on force on force, the russians know any kind of engagement to us would be very problematic for them. >> a couple of more. >> i am with radio free asia. i know today's topic focuses on china and russia. i want to get some comments on this issue. if you don't mind. there was no major nuclear missile test by north korea but there is indication they are developing their nuclear facility. how does dia, as of their latest capabilities on
nuclear and missile programs? also, there was a few short ranged ballistic missile test by north korea. and, how do you see if they are likely to have more nuclear integrations being stalled. >> let me comment on part of that discussion. what is our core mission. our core mission is to understand the operational environment and understand foreign military capabilities. while talks have paused or continue, that does not change what we do. we come to work and we still continue look, assess and try to understand the capability that kim jong-un possesses across all of the war fighting capability effort. we look for indications of development of new systems. i will not get into the details
obviously here. but, it is not changing our focus. we watch everything that is taking place closely. it combats to making sure, we are not pausing. we want to make sure they have as much information about what his capabilities are, what is being stated in a public forum and what we understand is happening but not being disclosed. >> reporter: we have time for maybe one or two questions? yes or? >> greg tillman, board member the arms control association. general ashley, can you tell us anything about the arming of the m-79 groun lunch cruise missile. is clearly nuclear conventional but it seems to have a conventional mission. >> it is nuclear capable. it can be configured with a nuclear capability or conventional. as stated, the challenges there
is no discernible markings on that cruise missile that would let you know if we see it. you can tell if it is a conventional nuclear version. but it is dual capable. >> yes sir? in the back. >> general, my name is don dirk. i'm a journalist in korea. i'm following up on this north korean issue. you gave us a briefing but what are the capabilities? what are they doing? and to what extent are they receiving advice from russia and china? and, cooperating with iran on nuclear development? thank you. one of the really challenging things you have in the subcommittee is what you can say and what you can't.
i appreciate interest and i can only assure you that we watch that with a laser focus. you asked me things i can't really disclose in a government form. but i do appreciate the question. >> one last question over here. >> good morning, general. thank you for being here. my name is julian lewis. i'm with the american university in washington. during the cuban missile crisis, president kennedy and the attorney general at the time really had to sit down and strategize on how they would incrementally reassure the american public of our ability to protect the homeland. because, there were a lot of confused and scared people at the time. and, i was hoping you could illustrate for us our strategy
as leaders in the united states to reassure citizens that we are able to protect our kids, keep us safe, protect our colleges and live the lives we all hope we can enjoy. thank you very much. >> i will punch your question to the next panel because that is what they do. i appreciate the way you from that. and somebody says what do you do for a living? i get up for exactly what jesus talked about. when i get up in the morning, i come to work because i want my kids, i want your family and siblings and you to enjoy the rest your time at american university. so, that's what i do for the last 35 years. and in terms of putting the details on that strategy on the policy side of the house, hopefully you will get picked on our next panel. thank you for pointing that
out. that is what gets me up in the morning. >> thank you so much. please join me in thanking the director for his time. >> next, house hearing on how members of congress can improve constituent services. then a discussion on u.s. relations with nato as the organization marks the 70th anniversary. after that, supreme court oral arguments on public employee discrimination lawsuits.
>> next, a hearing on how technology can improve the way members of congress engage with constituents. they talked about improving email communications and congressional town hall formats. this is just over an hour. >> will the members of the committee come to order. this hearing is titled improving constituent engagements. i recognize myself for five minutes to give an opening statement.