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tv   Matthew Kroenig The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy  CSPAN  June 1, 2018 10:06pm-11:07pm EDT

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the moscow summit between reagan and mikell gorbachev mack democracy in a complicated way but it is a good way and we believe the best way. once again mr. general secretary i want to extend to you and all of those for this moment my warmest personal thanks.
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>> with an important book in the foreign service university also senior fellow at the atlantic council and said time at the office secretary defense also served as a policy advisor on the romney presidential campaign as well as marco rubio. so the editor of the book and the one we're discussing this morning "the logic of american nuclear strategy" just recently out the past couple weeks. and just for the just a cool reason if we have to depart the building looked to me i will direct you to the back and then of course the stairs if anything happens look to
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me. so just as a conversation this is a new book about nuclear weapons it is very salient right now but having question to you is why do we need one more book about this nuclear strategy? it has been around for a long time so how does this work into the larger literature and what purpose does this book try to serve? >> first for hosting this event and also angst you for coming out. that is a good question there is a lot of writing over the years and theories of nuclear weapons but the theories aren't very good. so we know the second strike
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theory or disruption anyone who has taken that course of international relations knows the united states the ability to absorb a nuclear attack without surviving warheads to retaliate and once we can do that nuclear deterrence will hold but the problem in the real world is that united states is in content with those capabilities where thousand of counterforce targeting capabilities and they think it raises the important puzzle apart of united states and scholars have recognized that between the theory and the real world and have said he will dismiss the fact that you will stick with that theory that said my theories read the real world wrong but and try to explain
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why the united states always has interesting robust nuclear posture. >> what is the theory? >> talk about nuclear superiority but what do you mean by that? what is the theoretical contribution hadn't been done before that is important to explain? but then also how we think about it in the future? >> with those theories of nuclear deterrence of nuclear destruction that we threatened to kill a lot of people but the united states hasn't done targeting with counterforce targeting with the enemies nuclear weapons and the purpose of that is damage imitation but also a moral and
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legal reason for innocent civilians and a strategic reason as well and that contributes to that deterrence to strengthen the resolve of the allies so that is the bumper sticker for those scholars with the leading nuclear deterrence to said that is like a game of chicken in the argument in my book one side is driving a hummer in one side drives a previous and another thing that is unique about the united states and try to have those extended nuclear deterrence with 30 other countries that are nato
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in japan and australia and eventually u.s. nuclear strategy is promising nuclear chicken or potentially promising with nuclear chicken going against russia or japan or china or south korea against korea or potentially playing games with nuclear chicken you prefer to drive a hummer not a previous. >> but if someone doesn't swerve the logic of having enough of a threat in the interest in the first place so are you putting out there how does that differ from the past
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attempts to get at strategic stability or not having that swerve situation in the first place? how do you differ from that. >> so what we have argued before is leaders in the nuclear era on the one hand you want to intentionally for a nuclear war but could be catastrophic on the other hand international politics of serious conflict of interest and we see that now with the conflict between united states and north korea and united states and russia they just want to give into the adversaries because they are afraid of nuclear attack and in the middle is the newly wound up nuclear brinkmanship to raise the risk to force
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those adversaries to back down so i have a number of case studies in the book of the crisis and others through today so one of the questions is what determines the outcomes of the games of chicken? of previous strategists have said it's all about resolver how much you care about the issue? so look at the cuban missile crisis to say we just cared more? for the soviet union it was distant we were just a few miles off we had the greater risk so i agree with almost all of that but what that nuclear balance of power matters also with the cuban missile crisis there is a lot of evidence that leaders on both sides weren't paying attention to secretary of state and president kennedy in
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the meeting talked about substantial nuclear superiority that they live in the same extent that they live under hours in the joint chief of staff material defense mcnamara said now is not the time to run scared we have the advantage using the euphemism so essentially that is the logic of the argument that they do play the game of chicken and those capabilities another. >> so get you to define superiority. >> i think in the book you say it is a military nuclear vantage but of course that is pretty broad. i take it you are arguing if you acquire nuclear
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superiority but what does that mean? it is so quite so clear-cut russia has come a long way. is it possible this bifurcated way united states or others has such start superiority? >> i have a chapter with a nuclear exchange calculation of there was a nuclear war between united states and china and russia north korea and what would it look like? with united states went first or if the adversary goes first? so one of the things that becomes very clear the nuclear balance of power matters for the outcome if it does have that first-rate capability than we are willing to go
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first to stop those capabilities to the greatest extent possible and to protect ourselves that north korea could get weapons but with china we likely do not have first-rate capability that we do have significant damage capabilities if there was a war it is clear it would turn out much worse for china. >> what damage limitation are you talking about? >> i should talk about the logic of the american nuclear strategy with the department of defense and the counterforce here targeting so if you look at china's arsenal it has fixed icbms those are fairly easy military targets and stationary targets china
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has been interested in developing a submarine for sometimes this is the way united states ensures its survivability for one of the other weapons have guaranteed so they could try to trap and target the nuclear exchange we may not be able to get everything but something the chinese and the russians are worried we have the first-rate capability and destroy most of their nuclear forces and the first-rate. so that is what i mean by damage limitation and superiority can we reduce
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damage to ourselves and to our allies be met with this theory are you endorsing the first strike capability? do you approximate to the extent possible is the goal of u.s. policy? >> one of the things they argue against is the theoretical debate people say the goal is mutually assured destruction but i think there are cases where the united states and russia at the height of the cold war we had no choice. we were vulnerable besides looking for the advantage even though there were quantitative warhead caps that that would have been very hard but not
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the goal that could be unfortunate it should be superiority wake over japan at world war ii and thank god they didn't have and they got we have that over north korea or iran we would be better off to be in that situation but that many people start to go to that mutually assured destruction model when really the goal should be superiority. now it could be difficult to get those countervailing conditions but we are better off if we have less damage over the adversary. >> so with the thesis on that,
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whether thetes or someone else is superior, what are you suggesting about the importance of engaging in friendship? >> what are the risk as well for that recipe? >> the games of nuclear chicken are dangerous like the cuban missile crisis john kennedy said it was between one half and one third with nuclear exchange but the leaders face these decisions don't want to run the risk but some just want to give the adversary a free pass other than that nuclear brinkmanship and with that framework is a good way of understanding and
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with a more recent crisis but the thesis of the argument that they will be more likely to swerve and playing that game of nuclear chicken there is a lot of evidence in the book of the case studies of quantitative evidence that really stands out from the university of virginia or texas a&m with those with cambridge university press that they don't matter for international coercion and that quantitative data set with every threat issued from 1918 to the present and look at the success rate of the nuclear arms race they compare
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that to the success rate of nonnuclear states mason said the success rate is 20% of the time the adversary gets in with the success rate is the same for the nuclear weapons. so i'm interested because it is contrary and essentially that happens in a lot of cases set from 1918. >> so the nuclear state those with fewer nuclear weapons in those countries with fewer nuclear weapons.
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never in the history of the world did they take a new weapon state with more new fear weapons and then compel that against the inferior state to play nuclear chicken. >> so with that data set are there meaningful between u.s. and russia and china that more significantly inform the questions for the smaller things? how applicable is that? >> but they try to bridge the gap each weaned deterrence in the real world nuclear strategy but on the more academic side how do we know if the theories are right or
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not? there were big debates with that department of analysis and qualitative analysis so that physics and social science so the more pieces of evidence and then the more confident that you have and as a qualitative case study between the united states and russia look at the cuban missile crisis 1973 arab-israeli wars when kissinger made nuclear threat and then the soviet union decided not to intervene 1969 the soviet union and with the
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support that nuclear superior state that they run the risk of nuclear war and then they back down but then they pay to the nuclear balance of power and then with that conventional wisdom of mutual destruction. >> so look at this should have paid attention to the so now as a rhetorical the if you want to understand the world and understand the cases that you have to look at the leaders themselves. >> so it occurs to me that the recommendation to continue
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these pursue superiority make that possible so that is a way of responding to that problematic laziness of the security of our second strike for the overconfidence or under competent to play the brinksmanship game better than we do? >> it is about the nuclear posture review or to suggest the ultimate guaranteed to be secure and constantly attentive to little details to make sure that it is in fact secure but with this perpetual disavowing washington to pursue that war nuclear posture does that should we be
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talking about the incredible war fighting capability and apologizing to save you would never perceive that? >> when it comes to nuclear deterrence you are right they have a dichotomy with the war fighting strategy with no other area of life do we think that is fundamentally divorce from what happens if it fails. but offers theory doesn't work if you try to defer the adversary and that is fundamentally related and not
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to fight the nuclear war and then say what happens if deterrence does fail? my cds fundamentally linked. >> so right there in the beginning of the nuclear age brody says the purpose of the mayor -- military establishment not to fight wars but to prevent them. so is your take different? >> anything he is right but the question is how to do that? and with minimum deterrence because are we concerned with minimum deterrence or with second strike in submarines? the united states has never been interested in that. by talking about kennedy 1963
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talks about the nuclear arsenal for clinton when she was secretary of state to say we will be stronger than ever with more nuclear weapons many times over 12 last year said the nuclear arsenal was top of the pack. . . . .
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for that matter passive defenses that can contribute to our security and of others in this ring seamanship theory. >> your argument in the book is that it the united states willingness and resolve to send allies to defend her and just depends on her vulnerability to nuclear war so the more we can limit the vulnerability the more we can limit our adversaries vulnerability the better we can understand conflicts of interest with other aaron state. the answer is its offense and defense so having the nuclear capabilities to conduct counter for strikes and the capability which is something the united states has for decades been interested in.
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it's a part of the defense of whatever survives to be able to protect yourself and to protect your allies. in sports you have to play offense and defense and a nuclear strategy have to play off of that. of course is the preamble from 1972 recognizing the assumption that the defenses for strategic weapons would contribute to the capability so this must be a recipe for strategic instability would this recommendation be a recipe if we were to pursue that more actively? spin the first part of the book talks about the possible advantages of nuclear energy is and it talks about the advantages for warfighting but an argument is not only the
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superiority matters but nuclear proliferation and the new robust nuclear posture. and the cost. nonproliferation in the defense budget and what i show in the chapter there are costs in some cases but that's by the opponents of the nuclear strategy and often they are nonexistent so they are looking at on balance it makes sense what it's done. their advantage is to having this robust nuclear posture in the cost is nonexistent. if there's a constant to doing what we are doing. we have been doing crazy stuff
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and we should have followed the academic advice and i show in the book why the united states can pursue this robust nuclear posture without incurring major cost in terms of stability to the arms race. >> with that a conversation over the past six weeks around the modest supplements of the new npr recommendations. from a more theoretical perspective what are some other things that we ought to be thinking about in this country to get to the superiority that you are recommending with the suggestion that we are thinking about perhaps a less reluctant manner.
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>> i think we are already starting to think about some of those things so one possibility would he hypersonic -- and the icbm. one of the things that was strange about nuclear posture now is their icbms are more accurate just because the slbm were modernized at the end of the cold war and we didn't get around to modernizing the icbms. >> the particular mission would be what? >> the better can be used for counterforce targeting if you are trying to destroy a hardened silo the more accurate the more likely you are to kill that target so it contributes to counterforce in the united states and will continue to treat the accuracy of its defenses.
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and conducting counterforce strike in the united states because we care about international law. we don't want to target population centers and we don't want a lot of collateral damage so that's another thing that will allow the united states to destroy an enemy's nuclear forces without killing large amounts of people. >> where does escalation control given to those aunt the last thing you said it's not about the academic calculations of general war but the much smaller stuff that seems to be the intention right now so how do you see new rear superiority or military posture broadly fitting into frankly within a crisis hitting someone to back down communicating resolve and all that kind of thing and the
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escalating a situation. >> well, the argument is that the country is going to be more likely to back down and show a lot of evidence. that's exactly the way it plays out in the crisis and looking for off-ramps. the something contrary to the way some people and nuclear theorists talk about it. one argument that people make is the united states has superiority if we have counterforce targeting. a country that is outdone is going to have the use them or lose them pressures. we use nuclear weapons and that the luck it's not a superficial level they use them or lose something accents but a more
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fundamental level it does. north korea could potentially launch a nuclear war against united states. that would do away for kim jong-un guarantee the end of his country and the end of his regime. i think it doesn't really make much sense. it could escalate the crisis so few have superior nuclear posture you can convince your adversary that is not a nuclear war. >> just in very simple terms the concepts of deterrence and
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defense in defeat. it sounds like what you are suggesting is superiority requires that more attention on defeat capability and more attention on defense can contribute to the deterrence of nuclear power and assuming that everybody is clear on who is nuclear and who is not. is that right? >> that's exactly right and it sounds conversion of -- controversial in the classroom. >> not your classroom i hope. >> nuclear strategy is done we have always been adjusted in damage and the nuclear posture without damage limitation. we have always considered it important to target so again on
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one hand the argument is controversial because it's very different. this is the way the united states thinks about nuclear deterrence. >> we will have some questions about the book or policy issues and if we can get the microphone wait for the microphone and please state your name and affiliation. >> i haven't read the book yet but congratulations on all the great blurbs. i want to get into the cost issue. the soviet union questioned if they were going to be richer than we are. china is potentially richer than we are and they also hold trillions of dollars of our debt how is that going to factor in?
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>> i have a chapter in the book on the cost of building a nuclear posture and also on arms races. the united states shouldn't pursue superiority because it will lead to arms races russia and china and others will try for similar capabilities to close the gap at first on cost the united states is modernizing its nuclear arsenal over the next 30 years. the congressional budget office estimates this will cost $1.3 trillion. some people look at the numbers and say it's just unaffordable but if you put it into context depending on your five to 7% of the department of defense budget so is it too much to spend on nuclear weapons? people can disagree but secretary of defense metis said that it's the most important
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mission of the department of defense so five to 7% reasonable and maybe even a good value to me. it's interesting the united states china and north korea had superiority so focusing on china which you mention. their number of reasons for that one might think china's economy has been booming over the past several decades but that was nice the case and the second part of it was financial restrictions that prevent building a super power arsenal. in thinking about nuclear deterrence mao tse-tung and deng xiaoping still have a mutually-assured destruction model in mind. they say once you have a nuclear weapon that's enough to deter
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your adversary and so china today says we are going to quote nuclear deterrent. they have no interest in doing that. the final thing is china also has some arsenal problems that has prevented them from a robust nuclear arsenal. i'm told they don't really trust sending nuclear weapons to their military commanders that for a long time china has had a central post with the missiles and the submarines and other
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things. it's difficult to do what the united states has done over the past several decades with its nuke your posture. it's difficult to have a superpower posture. they think that's part of the reason my china and north korea haven't done that. >> appear in the front as well and then over here next. sam thinks. eric kershaw's senior adviser at csis. a follow-up on the cost issue i think you talked about president kennedy. the question is whether we -- not just the homer put the hummer stretch hummer with a bar and how much that in fact takes away from troops on the ground. every action since 19455 is the
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non-nuclear one. there've been a lot of them and you can only spend 1 dollar ones. >> it's a good question. kind of an argument that some people would take is we actually use their conventional weapons. we haven't used nuclear weapons so let's put our money into this more usable conventional weapon on the battlefield. i would actually argue i think we use nuclear weapons every day a nuclear strategist and the cold war said in chess you never use the queen. she can have upon it dance and she could be used as affecting moves and not that nuclear weapons are the same but even if they are not used their shadow hangs over any conflict
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involving united states. so i think both are important and then you get into the question of what is the relative importance and where should the resources be devoted. people could disagree and say five to 7% is too much but you can have that argument that it's a reasonable price, 96% of the budget is going to other things and 7% for nuclear i thank is reasonable. >> we have this gentleman here and we'll go over here. >> i want to start out by saying the nuclear posture shows the times that changed and it's no longer 10 years.
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i thank you for your book and taking that attitude in moving ahead with that in a positive way but i want to go more in particular was superiority in with the nuclear posture has recommended particular a with the launch cruise missiles and will that actually gives superiority to the defense of china. on the other end the confidence isn't overblown or is it realistic to ask. >> some of you might know the nuclear posture one of the more controversial elements was the call to bring supplemental nuclear capabilities. the obama administration put in place a plan to modernize the nuclear -- the trump administration dorsett and to
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get it to supplemental capability. as a submarine launched cruise missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile. it lowers the threshold of nuclear war. the reasonhe capabilities were recommended because of russia's nuclear strategy which is quite frightening so russia has this concept of u.s. military strikes if we get into war with russia especially russia might use one or two are small number of nuclear weapons on the assumption that they can pop up a couple of nukes and i think they are a number of reasons putin may thinking get away with that but harder because the adapter capability. yes a lot of battlefield nuclear capability nuclear weapons that could be used on the battlefield
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it's filling that gap to some degree giving the united states capability not because we want to use it but to deter putin to keep him from going down this path in the first place. of course a cruise missile is not an unrealistic capability. during the cold war we had to retire it so it was resurrecting capability from the past and the russians have similar capabilities. russia aubrey's -- already has a lot of nuclear weapons. in terms of the theory these limited nuclear strikes are essentially another way of moving the risk and nuclear brinksmanship. it's not that using one or two nuclear weapons of the case if they win the war but there will be more to come and essentially
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asking western leaders to want to run the risk of running out of control and i think the united states has interest. our allies in eastern europe so we need to have a serious defense strategy for that. so we need to be able to have a response if we are going to continue to play that game of nuclear brinksmanship. >> let me interject here because this might be a good moment to ask how your endorsement of superiority maps to the actions of russia? isn't the case that all these innovative things that putin is doing he's trying to get a superiority and the ability to get us to back him so in a way putin seems to be following it perhaps better than we are at can we also say to what extent does your theory map to the new
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recommendation of the npr? i think you alluded to this. it's not so much about getting superiority to defeat russia in the war as much as it is to get a few more options to frankly communicate on resolved when the credibility of our resolve and responded to that kind of scenario. so that is a two-part question. how well does your endorsement match with putin is doing and getting us to swerve and a nato kind of environment and are we actually pursuing superiority are we just trying to improve our resolve and communicate our resolve? >> i think the russians have often thought about nuclear weapons in a more similar way to the united states and they haven't had the same kind of theories of mutual oral mobility
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-- mutual vulnerability. in the united states strategists have had this traditional warfare operates according to a different logic and they are more similar than we imagined and we don't need to tell putin that i think. we can keep that as a usable weapon. this kind of what i was trying to say before. these games of nuclear brinksmanship leaders don't want to fight nuclear war but they do want to back down and be the nuclear chicken but if you want to keep pressing those pedals going at your abba seri you have to have the ability to keep
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going so you don't want big gaps in the escalation. it was something henry kissinger recognized early in the cold war. was there a choice between suicide and surrender that we get the choice of backing down or fighting a full scale nuclear war and we didn't need to have these options in between. i think it provides those supplements in preventing us in choosing to surrender so we can refresh the use of nuclear weapons try to defend its position that we can keep escalating the crisis without going into a full-scale nuclear exchange which would be catastrophic. >> right here and then right here. >> peter rogers retired
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executive interested in military affairs. [inaudible] >> it's a good question. part of the reason the united states has been interested in this robust nuclear posture for decades is because of its deterrence. if united states decided tomorrow we are going to pull back. we are going to have foreign policy on nuclear weapons then i think we could get away with a minimum nuclear deterrence. we could have a -- more like china. we ask our nuclear weapons to descend on the entire world so we are promising to play a game of nuclear chicken and if russia decides to challenge us on behalf of estonia and on behalf of latvia i think that's part of
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the reason we have this robust nuclear forces to credibly extend deterrence to allies. where the allies come in those we have this big we are sharing arrangement at nato to strategic forces. we have 200 or so gravity bombs deployed on the territory of nato allies. other allies have dual capable aircraft so aircraft that delivers either nuclear or conventional weapon. if we got into a major war with russia and the policy in the cold war that the allies could deliver a nuclear weapon. it would increase the credibility of deterrence and make the russians understand it's not just your president who might decide to use nuclear weapons but maybe european allies have been independent ability to use a nuclear weapon but also sharing a component
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that nato allies are participating. that will likely continue going forward as the allied powers are in the early stages of acquiring nuclear-capable aircraft to replace the aging tornadoes and other things. what is interesting though is when the united states decides to do something similar in asia. after the cold war we had nuclear weapons forward deployed and in south korea we put them out in the early 1990s. if the north korean nuclear threat many south korean experts have become leaders saying the united states needs to return its forward-deployed nuclear weapon and south korea will consider building an independent nuclear deterrent. my own view is right now there things we can do to increase the
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credibility and asia short of forward deploying nuclear weapons but i suspect this is an issue that's not going to go away anytime soon especially at north korea's missile program continues to advance. >> thank you. >> i'm with a national war college. your argument that nuclear superiority makes sense but only if the nuclear superior power is the status quo power not a revisionist power. in the book you talk about the potential for russia to go up to over 8000 nuclear warheads and i don't see any signs of the u.s. doing that just project forward and say what if russia remains a power and builds up an arsenal that size. what are the implications to your theory and what should the u.s. response to the?
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>> that's a great point. when i was talking about stability board of the united states has the first strike. my argument is essentially it's not but i think you are right at the shoe were on the other foot if russia china are nuclear -- had superior nuclear capability i suspect it they would try to use that for all intents and purposes and to some degree that's what we see in the russian strategy tactical nuclear advantage making explicit nuclear threats during crisis in ukraine so i think it's important the united states continued to maintain strategic parity at if not superiority over russia they share some of your concerns right now. we are deep in the s.t.a.r.t. treaty locked in with no more than 1000550 strategic deployed
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warheads. the peak for the united states was 1967. we had 31,255 nuclear warheads. so we have come down quite a bit with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty has us at 50/58 but what if russia decides to cheat on the new start treating it like it's done with a lot of arms agreements. what if they decide to expand the capability? what if they just kept going? we saw that putin's announcement last week with a nuclear capability. i worry about that and i think the united states needs to be prepared. in my view a think the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty is an artist that we have to be prepared for what happens if russia decides it no longer -- and i'm afraid right now our upper structures to tyranny to some degree and the nuclear posture recognized
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as. >> but may close out with this one and it's a question of numbers. going back to definition of nuclear superiority as having nuclear military advantage over someone else. listening to this and thinking of the special interest of npr here. is there an element of a military superiority but a political superiority and a superiority in terms of resolve especially given the emphasis they put on brinksmanship. you can have the stretch hummer with all the bells and whistles but if a person driving the stretch hummer doesn't really believe in it and furthermore thinks the guy in the prius is just not that might swerve and by the way doesn't come down to
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resolve? the best way to look willing is to be willing. it's so much of our conversation about trying to reinvigorate serious thinking about the capability to use these things in response to some of russia by russia? >> i think what matters is resolved. resolve to defend their interests and our allies and so the question is these traditional theories and mutually ensured destruction theory state recognize the country who plays nuclear chicken. the capabilities don't matter. what matters is how much you care about whatever it is you are fighting over and that's all that matters. what i'm arguing is they are right it does matter that
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capabilities matter to and capabilities affect resolve. after all we have to be more resolute in a game of chicken. i don't know about you but i think most of us would be and the stakes underlined the crisis are not something that the united states can't control. to some degree one characteristic of extended deterrence is arguably it always favors our adversary in a think russia has a story to tell why it cares more about estonia than rush it -- than the united states does. kim jong done tells a story about why he cares more about south korea banned the united states does so we are always operating from an arguable point and then we have the capability.
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to some degree that's nuclear capability. >> thank you very much. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
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next discussion about how civil rights activist change u.s. foreign policy with georgetown professor sarah snyder. she discussed her book "from selma to moscow" at the policies and prose bookstore in washington d.c.. this is an hour. see macadamia everyone. my name is liz artlip and i'm a member of the bands that would like to welcome you all to politics and prose bookstore. thanks for coming out. to rather your evening. we are here to listen to sarah snyder with her new book "from selma to moscow" how human rights activists transformed u.s. foreign policy


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